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Strong	Proportionality	and	Causal	Claims	Jennifer	McDonald	
	
Abstract	
	There	 are	 several	 supposedly	 lethal	 objections	 to	 the	 view	 that	 causation	 is	essentially	proportional.	The	first	targets	an	account	of	proportionality	in	terms	of	causal	models,	pointing	out	that	proportionality	is	too	easily	satisfied	in	causal	model	accounts	of	causation	through	manipulation	of	the	range	of	values	that	a	variable	can	take	(Franklin-Hall,	2016).	The	second	argues	 that	proportionality	legitimizes	only	 the	most	general	 things	as	causes,	and	proportionality	 thereby	contravenes	 causal	 intuitions	 (Bontly,	 2005;	 Franklin-Hall,	 2016;	 McDonnell,	2018,	2017;	Weslake,	2013).	The	 final,	and	perhaps	most	 intractable,	objection	holds	 that	 proportionality	 counter-intuitively	 legitimizes	 disjunctive	 causes	(Shapiro	 and	 Sober,	 2012;	 Weslake,	 2017;	 Woodward,	 2018).	 This	 paper	provides	 a	 unified	 response	 to	 these	 objections,	which	 is	 best	 formulated	 in	 a	causal	model	framework.	I	first	articulate	two	independently	plausible	principles	of	variable	selection	–	exclusivity	and	exhaustivity.	I	then	show	how	the	adoption	of	 these	 principles	 responds	 to	 Franklin-Hall’s	 objection,	 and	 dissolves	 the	remaining	two.		
	
1.	Introduction	
	Imagine	that	a	pigeon	named	Sophie	is	trained	to	peck	at	red	things	and	only	at	red	things.	Sophie	then	pecks	at	a	paint	chip,	which	is	a	particular	shade	of	red	–	scarlet.	Is	the	chip’s	being	red	or	its	being	scarlet	the	cause	of	Sophie’s	pecking?	Intuitively,	we	want	to	say,	the	cause	is	the	chip’s	being	red.	For,	had	the	chip	not	been	red	Sophie	would	not	have	pecked,	whereas	had	it	not	been	scarlet	she	still	might	have	–	had	it	been	burgundy	or	crimson	or	some	other	shade	of	red.1		The	 example	 of	 Sophie	 illustrates	 Stephen	 Yablo’s	 principle	 of	 proportionality.	Proportionality	holds	that	something	counts	as	a	cause	of	some	effect	just	in	case	its	description	includes	enough	but	not	too	much	causal	information	relevant	to	the	 description	 of	 that	 effect	 within	 the	 given	 context	 (Yablo,	 1992).	 Such	 a	principle	has	been	put	to	various	philosophical	uses:	for	example,	as	a	proposed	solution	 for	 the	 causal	 exclusion	 argument	 against	 non-reductive	 physicalism,	and	 as	 a	 justification	 and	 explanation	 of	 the	 privileging	 of	 higher-level	 causal	explanations	 in	 the	 special	 sciences.	 However,	 the	 precise	 formulation	 of	proportionality,	 and	 the	 role	 it	 should	 play	 (if	 any)	 in	 the	 metaphysics	 of	causation,	has	proven	to	be	controversial.			 	1	Sophie	has	been	borrowed	directly	from	(Yablo,	1992).	
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The	primary	 aim	of	 this	 paper	 is	 to	defuse	 three	objections	 to	proportionality.	One	objection,	put	forward	by	Laura	Franklin-Hall,	(Franklin-Hall,	2016),	argues	that	the	formulation	of	proportionality	within	a	causal	model	framework	is	easily	satisfied	without	successfully	privileging	intuitively	proportional	causes	such	as	red	 in	 the	 Sophie	 example.	 It’s	 therefore	 inadequate	 for	 capturing	 the	 kind	 of	causal	explanation	we’re	looking	for.	I	take	this	objection	to	apply	equally	well	to	any	 causal	 model	 account	 of	 causation.	 The	 second	 objection,	 separately	 put	forward	by	Thomas	Bontly	(2005),	Brad	Weslake	(2013),	Franklin-Hall	 (2016),	and	Neil	McDonnell	(2018,	2017),	can	be	called	the	problem	of	generic	causes.	 It	begins	with	 the	claim	 that	proportionality	 legitimizes	only	 the	most	general	or	abstract	 things	 as	 causes.	 However,	 it	 seems	 as	 though	many	 of	 our	 common-sense	 causal	 claims	 involve	 non-proportional	 causes.	 The	 requirement	 that	causes	 be	 proportional	 would	 therefore	 render	 many	 causal	 intuitions	 false.	Finally,	Larry	Shapiro	and	Elliott	Sober	(2012)	demonstrate	that	proportionality	counter-intuitively	 legitimizes	 disjunctive	 causes.	 This	 is	 particularly	 evident	with	things	like	non-monotonic	functions.		My	 response	 to	 these	objections	 takes	 the	 following	 form.	 For	 the	purposes	 of	this	paper,	the	most	useful	way	to	frame	causation	is	in	terms	of	causal	models.	This	is	because	a	causal	model	framework	is	explicit	about	what	features	of	the	situation	are	 assumed	 to	be	held	 fixed,	 and	about	 the	 range	of	 alternatives	 for	how	variable	features	could	have	possibly	been	different.	A	brief	overview	of	this	background	 framework	 is	 laid	 out	 in	 the	 next	 section.	With	 this	 framework	 in	place,	I	articulate	two	independently	plausible	and	widely	assumed	principles	of	variable	selection.	Although	pervasive,	these	principles	have	not	been	named	or	explicated.	 I	 therefore	 christen	 them	 exclusivity	 and	 exhaustivity.	 Exclusivity	ensures	that	a	variable	take	at	most	one	of	its	values.	Exhaustivity	ensures	that	a	variable	take	at	least	one	of	its	values.	Crucially,	these	principles	are	relative	to	the	modal	profile	of	the	target	causal	situation.			I	 then	 defend	 a	 causal	 model	 formulation	 of	 strong	 proportionality	 against	Franklin-Hall	 by	 showing	 that	 it	works	 fine	 so	 long	 as	 exhaustivity	 is	 in	 place.	Next,	 I	 answer	 the	 problem	 of	 generic	 causes.	 When	 translated	 into	 causal	models,	 and	with	 exclusivity	 and	 exhaustivity	 in	 place,	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 how	 the	examples	 from	 the	 literature	 are	 indeed	 proportional.	 The	 objection	 that	proportionality	contravenes	causal	intuitions	therefore	doesn’t	go	through.		Finally,	 I	 address	 the	 objection	 that	 proportionality	 counter-intuitively	legitimizes	disjunctive	causes.	I	point	out	how	much	of	what’s	compelling	about	this	 objection	 is	 dissolved	 in	 the	 same	way	 as	 the	 problem	 of	 generic	 causes.	However,	something	troubling	remains.	I	argue	that	this	is	not	as	troubling	as	it	seems.	
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2.	Causal	Models	
	In	 the	 last	 few	decades,	 several	accounts	of	 actual	 causation	 in	 terms	of	 causal	models	have	sprouted	up	(Halpern,	2016a;	Halpern	and	Pearl,	2005;	Hitchcock,	2001;	Pearl,	2000;	Weslake,	2015;	Woodward,	2003).	This	new	development	in	the	causation	 literature	has	proved	fruitful	and	“exciting”,	 to	quote	Christopher	Hitchcock	(2001,	p.	273).	Indeed,	the	causal	model	framework	will	be	crucial	for	my	 purposes,	 as	 it	 brings	 to	 light	 precisely	 how	 the	 objections	 to	 strong	proportionality	go	wrong.		There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 different	 types	 of	 models,	 but	 I’ll	 focus	 on	 the	 use	 of	structural	 equation	 models,	 in	 particular.	 I	 take	 there	 to	 already	 exist	 a	satisfactory	 number	 of	 useful	 articulations	 of	 such	 models	 in	 the	 literature	(Greenland	 and	 Brumback,	 2002;	 Halpern,	 2016a,	 2016b;	 Halpern	 and	 Pearl,	2005;	Harary	et	al.,	1965;	Hitchcock,	2018,	2009,	2001;	Pearl,	2000;	Spirtes	et	al.,	1993).	As	a	 result,	and	 in	 tandem	with	 the	 fact	 that	many	of	 the	 formal	details	won’t	actually	matter	 for	the	purposes	of	 this	paper,	 I	won’t	burden	the	reader	with	 yet	 another	 detailed	 overview.	 Suffice	 it	 here	 to	 say	 that	 a	 structural	equation	 model	 essentially	 represents	 causal	 relations	 between	 things	 in	 the	world	as	functional	equations	between	variables	in	a	model.	The	variables	on	the	right-hand	 side	 of	 an	 equation	 are	 all	 and	 only	 those	 variables	 for	 whom	interventions	on	their	values	result	in	a	change	in	the	value	of	the	left-hand	side	variable.	2	The	 form	 of	 the	 equation	 specifies	 the	 precise	 nature	 of	 these	correlated	 changes,	 and	 can	 be	 in	 terms	 of	 Boolean	 logic,	 probability	 logic,	arithmetic,	etc.	For	example,	say	that	a	binary	variable,	Z:	{z1,	z2},	 is	such	that	 it	will	take	z1	whenever	two	other	binary	variables,	X:	{x1,	x2}	and	Y:	{y1,	y2},	take	x1	and	 y1,	 respectively,	 and	 Z	will	 take	 z2	 otherwise.	 This	 could	 appear	 in	 our	structural	equation	model	as	any	of	the	following:	(𝑍 ≔ 𝑋 ∧ 𝑌);	(𝑍 ≔ min(𝑋, 𝑌));	(𝑍 ≔ 𝑋 + 𝑌).3		Variables	 represent	 the	 causal	 relata,	 whether	 they	 be	 events,	 property	instantiations,	 or	 whatever.	 I’ll	 assume	 that	 the	 causal	 relata	 are	 property	instantiations.	The	set	of	values	of	a	particular	variable	will	therefore	represent	a	set	 of	 properties	 –	 constrained	 by	 a	 given	 property	 type	 –	 that	 are	 possibly		2	An	intervention	on	a	variable	in	a	model	is	an	operation	that	forces	a	variable,	X,	to	take	a	certain	value	in	such	a	way	that	breaks	any	dependence	X	had	on	any	‘upstream’	or	‘parent’	variables	–	variables	that	figured	in	the	equation	for	X	prior	to	the	intervention.		3	These	functional	equations	can	be	taken	to	represent	either	counterfactual	relationships	between	relata,	and	therefore	reducible	to	counterfactuals	(see	Hitchcock,	2007;	Woodward,	2003),	or	primitive,	sui	generis	relationships,	which	generate	various	counterfactual	claims	(Hiddleston,	2005;	Pearl,	2000).	I	remain	neutral	on	which	position	is	correct.		
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instantiated	 by	 some	 particular	 thing.	 It’s	 worth	 noting,	 though,	 that	 the	variables	 of	 a	 model	 can	 be	 taken	 to	 represent	 a	 variety	 of	 things,	 and	 my	argument	 relies	 on	 the	 basic	 framework	 of	models,	 rather	 than	 the	 particular	choice	of	causal	relata.	So,	nothing	should	turn	on	this	assumption.		A	 model	 has	 two	 kinds	 of	 variables:	 exogenous	 and	 endogenous.	 Exogenous	variables	 have	 stipulated	 values	within	 the	model.	 Endogenous	 variables	 have	their	 values	 determined	 by	 the	 other	 variables	 within	 a	 model,	 in	 the	 way	specified	by	the	relevant	equation.			There	are	two	categories	of	rules	for	model	construction.4	The	first	are	formal	in	nature	 –	 constraints	 internal	 to	 the	model	 as	 a	mathematical	 entity.	 The	main	constraint	of	this	kind	is	that	a	variable	be	capable	of	taking	more	than	one	value.	This	is	widely	recognized.	The	second	are	principles	that	serve	to	ensure	that	the	relationship	between	the	model	and	the	situation	that	it	represents	is	of	the	right	sort.	 Although	 of	 greater	 philosophical	 interest,	 these	 have	 yet	 to	 be	 made	satisfactorily	explicit.	I	address	this	in	the	next	section.		One	thing	is	causally	related	to	a	second	just	in	case	it	figures	in	the	equation	for	the	second	thing	in	at	least	one	apt	model.5	This	core	criterion	of	causation	is	at	the	 type	 level.	 Accounts	 of	 actual,	 or	 token,	 causation	 then	 build	 up	 from	something	 like	 this	 core	 criterion	 using	 two	 key	 additions.	 First	 is	 added	 an	actuality	 condition,	 which	 ensures	 that	 actual	 causes	 and	 effects	 will	 only	 be	things	 that	 actually	 occur.	 Second	 is	 added	 a	 condition	 specially	 designed	 to	accommodate	 the	 infamous	 problem	 cases	 of	 overdetermination	 and	preemption.	I	remain	neutral	on	how	all	these	details	shake	out.	In	what	follows	I	will	refer	to	the	analysis	above	as	the	core	criterion	for	type-level	causation,	and	I	will	 assume	 that	 further	 analysis	 of	 actual	 causation	will	 somehow	deliver	 the	
basic	 requirements	 of	 actual	 causation.	 I	 would	 be	 obligated	 to	 precisify	 these	details	 if	 I	 were	 attempting	 to	 provide	 an	 account	 of	 causation	 or	 actual	causation.	But	 I’m	not.	 Instead,	 I’m	arguing	 that	 a	proportionality	 condition	on	causation	gets	our	 intuitions	 right,	 and	 that	 this	 is	especially	 illuminated	when	considering	the	causal	model	framework.	I’ll	therefore	leave	this	overview	here.6			4	Thanks	to	Jonathan	Schaffer,	in	discussion,	for	articulating	this	distinction.	5	The	choice	of	at	least	one	apt	model	is	widely	made,	but	not	logically	required.	One	could	define	causation	as	a	relation	that	holds	across	all	apt	models,	some	majority	of	apt	models,	some	significant	subset	of	apt	models,	etc.	One	could	also	avoid	talk	of	apt	models	altogether	by	making	the	causal	relation	model-relative.	But	the	sheer	volume	of	possible	models,	and	variation	between	them,	makes	this	unsatisfactory.	6	See	(Halpern,	2016a;	Halpern	and	Pearl,	2005;	Hitchcock,	2001;	Pearl,	2000;	Weslake,	2015;	Woodward,	2003)	for	complete	accounts	of	causation	in	terms	of	causal	models.	
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3.	Exclusivity	and	Exhaustivity:	Principles	of	Variable	Selection	
	A	causal	model	definition	of	cause	relies	on	a	notion	of	an	apt	model.	I	hold	that	a	model	 is	 apt	 in	 the	 relevant	 sense	 only	 if	 its	 variables	 respect	 two	 principles:	what	 I	 call	 exclusivity	 and	 exhaustivity.7	Take	 exclusivity	 first.	 There	 is	 a	 non-controversial	formal	constraint	that	requires	that	a	variable	not	take	more	than	one	value	at	a	time.	Exclusivity	is	a	representational	principle	that	ensures	this.	It	holds	 that	 the	 values	 of	 a	 single	 variable	 should	 represent	mutually	 exclusive	things,	so	 that	 the	occurrence	of	any	particular	 thing	represented	by	a	value	of	this	variable	excludes	the	occurrence	of	any	of	the	others.	 If	 two	things	are	not	exclusive	 –	 if	 they	 could	 occur	 together	 –	 then	 they	 should	 be	 represented	 by	distinct	 variables.	 In	 terms	of	 property	 instantiations,	 if	 two	properties	 can	be	instantiated	by	the	same	object	at	 the	same	time	–	such	as	 its	being	round	and	red	–	then	they	should	be	represented	by	different	variables.		Exclusivity	is	universally	assumed.	As	an	example,	take	Hitchcock:			 [W]e	must	ask	what	 it	means	 to	 represent	 two	events	 (such	as	a	 and	b)	 as	different	values	of	the	same	variable,	or	as	values	of	different	variables.	When	we	 represent	 two	 events	 as	 different	 values	 of	 the	 same	 variable,	 we	 are	representing	those	events	as	mutually	exclusive.	A	variable	is	a	function	(over	possible	 worlds,	 if	 you	 like),	 and	 hence	 it	 must	 be	 single-valued.	 (2004,	 p.	145)		While	 exclusivity	 ensures	 that	 a	 variable	 takes	 at	 most	 one	 of	 its	 values,	exhaustivity	ensures	that	a	variable	takes	at	least	one	of	its	values.	Exhaustivity	is	the	representational	principle	that	requires	that	a	variable’s	values	capture	the	entire	 range	 of	 relevant	 possibilities	 for	 whatever	 type	 of	 thing	 the	 variable	represents.	8	In	 terms	 of	 property	 instantiations,	 exhaustivity	 holds	 that	 a	variable’s	 values	 must	 jointly	 represent	 the	 range	 of	 possibilities	 of	 property	instantiation	by	the	given	object	for	the	given	property-type.	If	the	property-type	is	a	color,	for	example,	then	the	values	must	exhaust	the	color	spectrum.	This	can	be	done	quite	simply	with	a	binary	variable	that	can	take	the	values:	{being	some	
particular	color,	not-(being	that	particular	color)}.			 	7	Note	that	this	is	only	a	necessary	condition,	and	not	a	sufficient	one.	8	Note	that	although	inspired	by	it,	this	is	not	the	notion	of	exhaustivity	discussed	in	(Franklin-Hall,	2016).	Franklin-Hall	proposes	and	dismisses	an	exhaustivity	condition	that	“requires	that	the	cause	variable’s	values	collectively	exhaust	the…range	of	circumstances	by	which	the	explanandum	event	–	as	well	as	its	contrast	–	might	be	brought	about.”	(2016,	p.	566)	
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It’s	 not	 clear	 how	 controversial	 exhaustivity	 is.	 But	 it	 is	 widely	 taken	 to	 be	 a	natural	principle	of	variable	selection.	Woodward	writes,		 We	also	want	our	variables	to	take	a	range	of	values	corresponding	to	the	full	range	of	genuine	or	serious	possibilities	that	can	be	exhibited	by	the	system	of	interest.	(2016,	p.	1064)			In	 addition,	 Judea	 Pearl	 in	 his	 seminal	 text	 assumes	 both	 exclusivity	 and	exhaustivity	in	his	description	of	a	variable.	He	writes,	“Bi,	i	=	1,	2,	…,	n,	is	a	set	of	exhaustive	 and	 mutually	 exclusive	 propositions	 (called	 a	 partition	 or	 a	
variable)…”	(2000,	p.	3)	Several	pages	later,	he	continues,	
	 Likewise,	 each	 variable	 X	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 partition	 of	 the	 states	 of	 the	world,	 since	 the	 statement	 X	 =	 x	 defines	 a	 set	 of	 exhaustive	 and	mutually	
exclusive	sets	of	states,	one	for	each	value	of	x.	(2000,	p.	9,	emphasis	my	own)		Finally,	in	their	discussion	of	interventionist	counterfactuals,	Ray	Briggs	assumes	both	exclusivity	and	exhaustivity,		 Each	V∈V	comes	with	a	range	R(V)	of	possible	values	–	that	is,	answers	to	 the	question	posed	by	 the	variable.	 I	assume	that	 the	answers	 to	any	given	 question	 are	mutually	exclusive	 and	 jointly	exhaustive,	 and	 that	no	
answer	 to	 one	 question	 entails	 an	 answer	 to	 any	 other.	 (2012,	 p.	 142,	emphasis	my	own)				I	take	there	to	be	more	representational	principles	for	models	than	the	two	I’ve	enumerated	 here.	 For	 example,	 we	 may	 need	 something	 like	 distinctness	 –	 a	principle	 that	 holds	 that	 things	 which	 are	 represented	 by	 distinct	 variables	should	be	metaphysically	distinct.	But	only	the	two	principles	of	exclusivity	and	exhaustivity	 are	 needed	 for	 my	 current	 argument,	 so	 I	 leave	 a	 more	comprehensive	discussion	of	representational	principles	for	another	work.		
4.	Relativizing	to	Modal	Context		As	 I’ve	mentioned,	 exclusivity	 and	 exhaustivity	 are	widely	 assumed,	 but	 rarely	articulated.	 This	may	 explain	why	 the	 following	 has	 not	 been	 registered.	 Once	articulated,	 we	 can	 see	 that	 each	 principle	 makes	 reference	 to	 possibilities.	Exclusivity	 holds	 that	 every	 value	 of	 a	 variable	 should	 exclude	 –	 as	 in,	 render	impossible	–	any	of	 its	other	values.	Exhaustivity	holds	 that	a	variable’s	values	must	jointly	represent	the	entire	range	of	relevant	possibilities.	These	principles	therefore	call	for	an	explication	of	the	nature	of	this	possibility.			
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I	propose	that	the	range	of	possibilities	presupposed	by	exclusive	and	exhaustive	variables	is	determined	by	what	I	call	the	modal	context.	The	modal	context	is	the	set	of	initial	conditions	of	the	system	under	inquiry.	The	notion	is	essentially	the	same	as	 the	 traditional	notion	of	causal	field.9	But	 the	 term	 ‘modal’	 is	meant	 to	draw	attention	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 initial	 conditions	 include	both	how	things	actually	 are	 as	 well	 as	 how	 things	 could	 have	 been.	 So,	 the	 modal	 context	 is	constituted	 by	 the	 actual	 particular	 facts	 –	 about	 what	 things	 exist	 and	 what	properties	 these	 things	 have	 –	 and	 the	 possible	 particular	 facts	 –	 about	 what	properties	 the	 existent	 things	 could	 have	 had,	what	 things	 could	 have	 existed,	and	what	properties	these	possible	things	could	have	had.	The	modal	context	for	Sophie’s	case,	for	example,	will	include	the	range	of	possible	colors	that	the	chip	might	have	been.			To	 illustrate	 how	 exclusivity	 and	 exhaustivity	 are	 relative	 to	 a	modal	 context,	take	the	causal	claim,	‘The	chip’s	being	scarlet	is	the	cause	of	the	pigeon	pecking.’	I’ll	 assume	 that	 the	 claim	 refers	 to	 a	 concrete	 situation	 in	 the	 world,	 with	 an	actual	scarlet	chip	and	an	actual	red-pecking	pigeon.	Note	that	 this	claim	alone	leaves	out	some	details.	The	shape	of	the	modal	context	depends	on	how	these	details	are	filled	in.	The	situation	to	which	this	claim	refers	may	be	one	in	which	the	 chip	 could	 have	 possibly	 been	 any	 other	 color.	 In	 which	 case,	 the	 modal	context	would	 include	the	possibility	 that	 the	paint	chip	takes	any	color	within	the	color	spectrum.	A	variable,	C,	that	can	 take	 the	values	 {cyan,	scarlet},	 is	not	exhaustive	relative	to	this	modal	context.	C	would	therefore	be	an	inappropriate	variable.	 But	 the	 variable	 T:	 {taupe,	 scarlet,	 cyan,	 mauve,	 crimson,	 etc.}	 is	exhaustive.	 An	 exhaustively	 appropriate	 model	 of	 this	 situation	 will	 therefore	include	T,	rather	than	C.			Alternatively,	 this	 claim	may	refer	 to	a	 situation	near	a	 local	paint	 chip	 factory	that	specializes	in	just	the	colors	scarlet	and	cyan,	and	no	others.	In	this	case,	the	scarlet	 chip	 could	 only	 have	 otherwise	 been	 cyan.	 The	 modal	 context	 will	therefore	include	that	the	chip	is	scarlet	and	only	could	have	possibly	been	cyan.	Relative	 to	 this	 context,	 C	 is	 an	 exhaustive	 variable,	 and	 so	 a	 model	 which	includes	C	will	be	exhaustively	appropriate.			
5.	Proportionality	as	Relational	Property	between	Variables		I	now	have	the	framework	with	which	to	define	proportionality.	As	a	first	pass,	proportionality	 can	be	 represented	 as	 a	 relational	 property	holding	between	 a	cause	variable	and	an	effect	variable.	Two	variables	will	be	proportional	 just	 in	case	 changes	 in	one	of	 them	(the	 cause	variable)	 line	up	 in	 the	 right	way	with	changes	 in	 the	 other	 (the	 effect	 variable).	 This	 captures	 the	 intuition	 that	 the		9	(Anderson,	1938;	Mackie,	1974,	1965)	
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paint	chip’s	being	red	is	proportional	to	Sophie’s	pecking	because	changes	in	the	chip’s	shade	from	red	to	otherwise	will	correspond	to	changes	in	whether	Sophie	pecks.	But	this	is	not	a	definition	–	more	needs	to	be	said	about	what	it	is	to	‘line	up	in	the	right	way’.		To	motivate	the	definition	I	eventually	adopt,	I’ll	 first	translate	Yablo’s	example	into	 causal	 model	 terms.	 Take	 the	 variable,	 P,	 to	 be	 a	 variable	 representing	whether	Sophie	the	pigeon	pecks	or	not.	It	can	take	the	values:	{peck,	not-peck}.	Now	 consider	 two	 alternative	 variables	 for	 representing	 the	 property-instantiations	of	 the	paint	chip:	 the	variable,	R,	which	can	 take	 the	values	 {red,	
not-red},	 and	 the	 variable,	 T,	 which	 can	 take	 the	 values	 {taupe,	 scarlet,	 cyan,	
mauve,	crimson,	etc.},	where	‘etc.’	stands	for	all	other	physically	possible	colors	at	the	same	grain	as	 those	already	made	explicit.	These	 two	variables	are	equally	good	 in	a	number	of	ways.	First,	 variables	R	and	T	each	 respect	 the	exclusivity	and	exhaustivity	principles.	Second,	each	of	R	and	T	counts	as	causally	related	to	
P	according	 to	 the	 core	 criterion	 of	 causation	 given	 above.	 The	 variable	P	will	change	values	whether	you	 intervene	 to	change	 the	value	of	R	from	red	to	not-
red,	 or	 intervene	 to	 change	 the	 value	 of	 T	 from	 crimson	 to	 taupe.	 But	 the	relationships	that	R	and	T	respectively	bear	to	P	are	different.	All	of	the	changes	in	R	line	up	with	changes	in	P	–	every	intervention	on	R	corresponds	to	P	taking	a	different	 value.	There	 is	 a	 one-to-one	 correspondence	between	 the	 values	of	R	and	those	of	P.	But	only	some	of	the	changes	in	T	line	up	with	those	in	P	–	only	certain	interventions	on	T	correspond	to	P	taking	a	different	value.	If	the	value	of	
T	is	taupe,	say,	then	the	intervention	that	assigns	T	the	value	cyan,	 for	example,	does	not	 so	correspond.	So,	 there	 is	not	a	one-to-one	correspondence	between	the	values	of	T	and	P.		This	 is	 the	 feature	 we’re	 looking	 for	 to	 define	 proportionality.	 Variable	 R	 is	
proportional	to	variable	P,	while	T	is	not,	because	the	values	of	R	counterfactually	line	up	one-to-one	with	those	of	P,	while	those	of	T	do	not.	This	insight	can	first	be	 translated	 into	 an	 account	 of	what	 it	 is	 for	 a	 variable	 to	 be	 proportional	 to	some	 other	 variable.	 A	 variable,	 C,	 is	 a	 proportional	 variable	 to	 some	 other	variable,	E,	just	in	case	every	intervention	on	C	that	changes	it	from	any	one	value	to	any	other	will	correspond	to	a	change	in	the	value	of	E.	More	precisely:		 (𝑷.)	C	 is	a	proportional	variable	relative	to	E,	given	a	model	𝔐,	 just	 in	case	every	intervention	that	is	on	C,	and	on	no	other	variable	in	𝔐,	corresponds	to	
E	taking	a	different	value.10			
	10	This	is	perhaps	what	Woodward	means	to	pick	out	with	his	Principle	P	(2010,	p.	298),	but	perhaps	not.	His	principle	is	too	vague	to	tell.		
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A	 cause,	 then,	 is	proportional	 to	 an	 effect	 just	 in	 case	 there	 is	 an	 apt	model	 in	which	it	can	be	represented	by	a	proportional	variable	relative	to	the	effect.	This	provides	for	the	following	definition	of	proportionality	in	terms	of	causal	models.			 (P)	A	cause,	A,	 is	proportional	 to	an	effect,	B,	 just	 in	 case	 (i)	A	 satisfies	 the	core	 criterion	 of	 causation	 relative	 to	 B;	 and	 (ii)	 there	 is	 an	 apt	model	𝔐,	where	A	is	represented	by	the	value	of	some	variable,	C,	and	B	by	the	value	of	some	other	variable,	E,	according	to	which	C	is	a	proportional	variable	to	E.11		There	are	three	positions	on	the	significance	of	a	principle	like	P.	First,	so-called	
strong	 proportionality	 takes	 proportionality	 to	 be	 a	 necessary	 feature	 of	causation.	12	So,	one	thing	is	the	cause	of	something	else	only	if	it	satisfies	P.	It’s	worth	noting	 that	 this	view	allows	 that	 there	 still	be	merely	 causally	 sufficient	and	 causally	 relevant	 relata	 for	 a	 given	 effect.	 It’s	 just	 that	 these	 are	distinguished	from	the	proportional	cause,	which	is	the	cause	of	that	effect.	Yablo	writes,			 What	 distinguishes	 causation	 from	 these	 other	 [causal]	 relations	 is	 that	causes	 are	 expected	 to	 be	 commensurate	with	 their	 effects:	 roughly,	 they	should	 incorporate	 a	 good	 deal	 of	 causally	 important	material	 but	 not	 too	much	that	is	causally	unimportant.	(1992,	pp.	273–274)		In	 line	 with	 this	 plurality,	 it	 need	 not	 be	 a	 commitment	 of	 the	 strong	proportionalist	 that	 causal	 models	 must	 only	 represent	 proportional	 relata.	Causal	 models	 can	 still	 be	 used	 to	 model	 merely	 causally	 sufficient	 and/or	relevant	 relata.	It’s	 just	 that	 these	 relations	 are	 not	 causation,	 but	mere	 causal	sufficiency	or	causal	relevance.13		Against	this,	a	second	position	–	weak	proportionality	–	takes	proportionality	to	be	 a	merely	 pragmatic	 constraint	 on	 causation.	14	Weak	 proportionality	 denies		11	The	definition	specifies	that	there	is	an	apt	model,	rather	than	for	every	model,	to	allow	for	the	possibility	that	there	may	be	an	apt	model	in	which	the	proportional	cause	doesn’t	even	appear.	12	See	(List	and	Menzies,	2009;	Menzies	and	List,	2010;	Papineau,	2013;	Yablo,	1992).	13	This	point	is	overlooked	in	the	literature.	It’s	worth	belaboring	it.	It’s	open	to	a	strong	proportionalist	to	argue	that	our	causal	talk	can	pick	out	not	only	proper	causation	–	which	is	proportional	–	but	also	causal	sufficiency	and	causal	relevance.	Plausibly,	the	term	‘causes’	in	natural	language	is	ambiguous	between	these	various	relations.	The	important	intuitions,	then,	against	which	to	check	the	plausibility	of	strong	proportionality	are	about	claims	of	the	form	‘This	is	the	
cause	of	that,’	rather	than	those	of	the	form	‘This	causes	that.’	14	See	(Blanchard,	2018;	Bontly,	2005;	Maslen,	2017;	McDonnell,	2018,	2017;	Weslake,	2017,	2013;	Woodward,	2015;	Yablo,	2003).	
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that	 genuine	 causation	 requires	 proportionality,	 while	 admitting	 that	proportional	 causes	 are	 at	 least	 sometimes	 better	 than	 non-proportional	 ones	for	 pragmatic	 reasons.	 For	 example,	 it’s	 perhaps	 often	 the	 case	 that	 causes	satisfying	P	are	more	explanatorily	useful	than	those	failing	to	so	satisfy.			Finally,	 there	 is	 the	 position	 –	 we	 can	 call	 this	 view	 no	proportionality	 –	 that	denies	the	value	of	a	proportionality	principle	altogether.	15	It	argues	that	there	is	no	 real	privilege	of	 causes	satisfying	P,	 or	 that	even	 if	 there	were	 it	does	no	real	theoretical	work.	This	paper	defends	strong	proportionality.			Note	that	proportionality	is	defined	in	terms	of	proportional	variables	within	apt	causal	models.	And	the	previous	two	sections	explain	how	a	causal	model	is	apt	only	 if	 its	variables	respect	exclusivity	and	exhaustivity	relative	 to	 the	relevant	modal	 context.	 So,	 something	will	be	proportional	only	 relative	 to	 some	modal	context	–	in	addition	to	being	relative	to	some	particular	effect.	Refer	back	to	the	previous	section’s	comparison	between	the	modal	context	where	the	paint	chip	could	be	any	other	color	and	the	local	factory	context	where	the	paint	chip	could	only	have	been	scarlet	or	 cyan.	 In	 the	 former,	 the	 causal	 claim	 that	 ‘The	chip’s	being	 scarlet	 is	 the	 cause	 of	 the	 pigeon	 pecking’	 is	 false	 because	 T	 is	 not	proportional	 to	P	 in	 this	context.	Sophie	will	peck	 in	response	 to	shades	of	red	other	than	scarlet,	so	an	intervention	on	T	that	changes	its	value	from	scarlet	to	
crimson	will	not	correspond	to	a	change	in	P.	In	the	latter	context,	however,	the	causal	 claim	 is	 true	because	C	 is	proportional	 to	P	relative	 to	 that	 context.	Any	intervention	on	C	given	the	context	of	the	local	paint	chip	factory	will	correspond	to	a	change	in	P.		This	 relativization	 to	 modal	 context	 does	 not	 undermine	 the	 objectivity	 of	proportionality.	It’s	true	that	some	things	are	determined	pragmatically,	such	as	which	 effect	 and	which	modal	 context	we’re	 talking	 about.	 But,	 once	 an	 effect	and	modal	context	are	fixed,	features	about	the	world	are	solely	responsible	for	what	counts	as	proportional	relative	to	that	effect	within	that	context.	
	
	
6.	Proportionality	Does	the	Trick	
	Franklin-Hall	 contends	 that	 the	 interventionist	 formulation	 of	 proportionality	doesn’t	successfully	prioritize	intuitively	proportional	causal	relata,	such	as	red	in	the	pigeon	example	(Franklin-Hall,	2016).		
	
	15See	(Franklin-Hall,	2016;	Hoffmann-Kolss,	2014;	Menzies,	2008;	Shapiro	and	Sober,	2012).	I’m	ignoring	this	position	at	present.	
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Refer	back	to	Sophie	and	her	paint	chip.	Franklin-Hall	 introduces	a	comparison	between	 the	 causal	 variable,	 R,	 that	 can	 take	 the	 values:	 {red,	 not-red},	 (as	above),	 and	 a	 variable,	 C,	 that	 can	 instead	 take	 the	 values:	 {cyan,	 scarlet}	 (as	above).	R,	as	before,	is	proportional	to,	and	therefore	a	genuine	cause	of,	P.	But,	she	argues,	C,	too,	is	proportional	to	P,	since	C	seems	to	satisfy	PV	relative	to	P.	An	intervention	on	C	that	changes	its	value	from	cyan	to	scarlet	changes	P	from	not-
peck	 to	 peck,	 and	 an	 intervention	 that	 changes	 C’s	 value	 from	 scarlet	 to	 cyan	changes	P’s	value	from	peck	to	not-peck.	Thus,	the	changes	in	C	line	up	with	the	changes	 in	 Y	 just	 as	 well	 as	 the	 changes	 in	 R	do.	 The	 problem,	 then,	 is	 that	proportionality,	 as	 formulated,	 is	 insufficient	 to	 its	 intended	 task.	 It	 fails	 to	privilege	a	variable	like	R	over	one	like	C,	and	so	fails	to	prioritize	a	causal	model	that	uses	R	over	one	that	uses	C.		In	response	to	this	problem,	a	natural	move	would	be	to	find	a	way	to	disqualify	variables	like	C	from	the	arena.	Intuitively,	C	is	not	the	right	kind	of	variable.	But,	why	not?	I	propose	that	our	aversion	to	variables	like	C	is	due	to	their	failure	to	exhaustively	 represent	 the	 implicit	 modal	 context	 of	 the	 situation.	 The	background	possibilities	relative	to	the	paint	chip	include	the	full	color	spectrum.	Unless	the	possible	color	of	the	paint	chip	is	restricted	in	some	special	way	–	by	the	local	factory,	perhaps	–	then	the	target	object	can	fail	to	take	one	of	C’s	two	values.	There	are	other	possible	colors	that	the	paint	chip	could	have	had	–	such	as	beige	or	olive	green	–	and	C’s	values	fail	to	represent	these	possibilities.			Relative	to	the	implicit	modal	context,	then,	C	is	not	an	exhaustive	variable.	The	variable,	R,	on	the	other	hand,	is	exhaustive,	since	the	object	must	take	one	of	R’s	two	 values.	 By	 requiring	 exhaustive	 variables,	 C	 is	 discounted	 as	 a	 candidate	variable	 relative	 to	 the	 implicit	 modal	 context,	 and	 R	 takes	 privilege	 as	 the	proportional	 cause.	More	 formally,	 the	model	 relative	 to	which	C	satisfies	PV	 is	not	an	apt	model	in	this	situation.		In	general,	two	variables	are	in	proper	competition	with	each	other	over	which	is	proportional	 to	 some	 effect	 variable	 only	when	 they	 are	 exhaustive	 relative	 to	the	same	modal	context.	C	and	R	are	not	competitors	for	proportionality	relative	to	P,	since	only	one	of	them	can	contain	an	exhaustive	set	of	possibilities	relative	to	any	given	modal	context.	
	
7.	The	Problem	of	Generic	Causes	
	The	primary	objection	pitched	 against	 strong	proportionality	 is	what	 I	 call	 the	
problem	of	generic	causes.	 The	 objection	 begins	 by	 pointing	 out	 that	 only	 very	general	 or	 abstract	 causes	 will	 satisfy	 a	 principle	 of	 proportionality.	 If	proportionality	is	required	of	something	to	be	a	cause,	as	strong	proportionality	claims,	 then	 many	 things	 that	 we	 would	 naturally	 call	 causes	 don’t	 actually	
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qualify.	 But	 surely	 common	 sense	 is	 not	 as	 deeply	 misguided	 as	 strong	proportionality	 requires.	 Strong	 proportionality,	 then,	 must	 go.	 (Bontly,	 2005;	Franklin-Hall,	2016;	McDonnell,	2018,	2017;	Weslake,	2013).			To	 illustrate,	 I’ll	 work	 with	 one	 of	 Bontly’s	 examples,	 but	 Weslake’s	 and	McDonnell’s	are	of	the	same	kind.	Take	the	case	where	Socrates	drinks	hemlock	and	then	dies,	and	the	corresponding	causal	claim,	‘Socrates’s	drinking	hemlock	is	the	cause	of	him	dying’.	The	objection	is	that	drinking	hemlock	is	not	actually	proportional	 to	 Socrates	 dying.	 	 If	 Socrates	 had	 not	 drank	 hemlock	 but	 still	consumed	it	–	by	eating	a	dozen	leaves,	perhaps	–	then	he	still	would	have	died.	This	 seems	 to	 show	 that	 the	 changes	 in	 the	 variable	 that	 represents	 Socrates	drinking	hemlock	don’t	line	up	in	the	right	way	with	the	changes	in	the	variable	that	 represents	 Socrates	 dying.	 The	 first	 variable	 could	 change	 values	 from	
having-drank-hemlock	 to	 having-eaten-hemlock	 and	 the	 second	 variable	 would	retain	 the	 value	 dies.	 This	 causal	 claim	 is	 therefore	 not	 proportional.	 The	proportional	cause	should	be,	instead,	Socrates’s	consuming	hemlock.			One	might	run	this	objection	even	further.	The	above	of	course	assumes	that	no	other	 lethal	 forces	 are	 at	 play.	 But,	 Socrates	 also	 would	 have	 died	 had	 he	performed	seppuku,	or	had	he	 refused	 food	and	drink	 for	 several	days.	So,	 the	real	 proportional	 cause	 should	 be,	 instead,	 something	 like	having-had-a-lethal-
experience.	 For	 only	 something	 as	 general	 or	 abstract	 as	 this	 could	 genuinely	satisfy	proportionality.		However,	 if	 we	 assume	 a	 causal	 model	 framework	 with	 exclusivity	 and	exhaustivity,	then	the	problem	of	generic	causes	is	mistaken	on	two	counts.	This	can	be	demonstrated	by	 first	 pointing	out	 that	 the	 formulation	of	 the	problem	doesn’t	respect	the	exhaustivity	principle	of	variable	selection	and	fails	to	attend	to	 the	modal	 context.	As	 a	 result,	 it	 equivocates	between	different	background	modal	contexts.	Moreover,	though,	it	doesn’t	respect	exclusivity,	and	as	a	result	runs	together	what	should	be	different	variables.	Once	you	set	up	a	model	 in	a	way	that	respects	exclusivity	and	exhaustivity,	the	problem	dissolves.		
8.	How	Exhaustivity	Preserves	Causal	Intuitions		Take	 the	 hemlock	 example	 just	 outlined.	 Importantly,	 this	 example	 and	corresponding	claim	are	under-defined.16	Translated	into	causal	model	terms,	all	that	 this	 description	 provides	 is	 that	 there	 is	 some	 variable	 that	 takes	 at	 least	one	value	that	represents	Socrates	drinking	hemlock,	and	an	intervention	on	this	variable	changes	the	value	of	some	other	variable	to	one	that	represents	Socrates		16	This	is	not	a	new	observation.	See	(Franklin-Hall,	2016;	McDonnell,	2017;	Weslake,	2017)	
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dying.	But,	a	number	of	different	variables	could	represent	the	purported	cause,	and	a	number	of	different	models	could	represent	its	relationship	to	the	effect	of	Socrates’	dying.	Which	of	these	 is	representationally	accurate	depends	on	what	the	relevant	alternatives	to	drinking	hemlock	are.	How	these	details	get	filled	in	will	 also	 determine	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 variable	 that	 represents	 Socrates	drinking	hemlock	is	proportional.			The	causal	claim	that	drinking	hemlock	causes	Socrates’s	death	implicitly	takes	the	 relevant	 alternative	 to	 be	 Socrates’s	 not	 drinking	 hemlock.	 I	 hold	 that	 the	default	 context	 is	 taken	 to	 be	 that	 hemlock	was	 the	 only	 possible	 poison,	 and	drinking	 it	 the	 only	 possible	 means	 of	 consumption,	 for	 reasons	 I’ll	 provide	shortly.	 Given	 such	 a	 context,	 the	 exhaustive	 variable	 representing	 Socrates	drinking	 hemlock	 has	 the	 values	 {having-drank-hemlock,	 not-having-drank-
hemlock}	–	call	this	D.	The	exhaustive	variable	representing	Socrates’s	death	has	the	 values	 {having-died,	 not-having-died}	 –	 call	 this	 F.	 But,	 D	 is	 indeed	proportional	 to	 F.	 When	 an	 intervention	 sets	 the	 value	 of	D	 to	 having-drank-
hemlock,	F	takes	the	value	having-died.	When	an	intervention	sets	the	value	of	D	instead	 to	not-having-drank-hemlock,	F	 changes	 value	 to	not-having-died.	 Thus,	the	common	sense	cause	is,	in	fact,	proportional.		Such	a	defense	first	requires	that	causal	claims	be	implicitly	relative	to	a	modal	context.	This	kind	of	relativity,	however,	 is	explicitly	denied	by	both	McDonnell	and	Weslake	 (McDonnell,	2017;	Weslake,	2017).	They	each	claim	 that	 if	 causal	claims	are	indeed	relative	to	a	context,	then	we	wouldn’t	be	able	to	agree	on	the	truth	value	of	 the	claim	before	 settling	 the	context.	The	very	 fact	 that	we	have	strong	 and	 convergent	 intuitions	 about	 these	 examples,	 despite	 their	 being	under-determined,	demonstrates	that	the	intuitions	are	not	sensitive	to	filling	in	modal	details.			In	response,	 I	argue	that	we	do	tend	to	settle	on	a	context	 for	causal	examples,	but	we	do	go	about	this	in	the	same	way	that	we	would	go	about	filling	in	missing	context	 in	 standard	 conversations.	 17 	According	 to	 Grice,	 communication	generally	 is	 governed	 by	 a	 set	 of	 unspoken	 but	 presupposed	 conversational	maxims	 (Grice,	 1989).	The	maxims	most	 relevant	 to	 how	 an	 audience	 engages	with	 these	 under-defined	 causal	 examples	 are	 the	 maxims	 of	 quantity	 and	
relation.	Taken	together,	these	maxims	enjoin	an	interlocutor	to,			
	17	A	similar	point	is	made,	to	different	effect,	by	Bontly	(2005).	It	may	also	need	saying	that	this	move	bears	resemblance	to	that	made	by	any	view	that	takes	causal	claims	to	be	sensitive	to	contrasts,	where	the	contrasts	are	set	by	conversational	context	(Schaffer,	2012;	Shapiro	and	Sober,	2012).		
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Make	 your	 contribution	 as	 informative	 as	 is	 required	 (for	 the	 current	purposes	 of	 exchange)….[and	 no]	 more	 informative	 than	 is	required,….[and	b]e	relevant.	(1989,	pp.	26–27)		Thus,	 the	 conversationally	 natural	 way	 to	 fill	 in	 the	 modal	 context	 of	 these	examples	is	to	take	each	fact	as	informative	and	relevant,	and	to	assume	that	all	informative	facts	have	been	provided.		My	defense	 further	requires	 that	 the	 implicit	modal	context	 is	as	 I’ve	specified.	My	reasoning	follows.	The	only	information	provided	by	the	hemlock	example	is	(i)	 that	 Socrates	drinks	hemlock;	 and	 (ii)	 that	 Socrates	dies.	 If	we	assume	 that	Gricean	maxims	have	been	obeyed,	which	we	do	in	standard	conversations,	then	we	can	assume	that	this	is	all	the	information	needed,	and	nothing	significant	has	been	 left	 out.	 Any	 unspecified	 details	 will	 get	 filled	 in	 as	 continuous	 with	everyday	life.	The	modal	context	will	be	taken	as	having	a	similar	environment,	a	biologically	similar	Socrates,	etc.,	to	everyday	life.			The	main	emphasis	in	the	example	is	on	Socrates’s	drinking	hemlock.	This	means	that	 in	 evaluating	 the	 causal	 relationship,	 everything	 else	 is	 held	 fixed	 and	 the	fact	of	the	drinking	hemlock	is	varied.	Due	to	the	absence	of	any	other	details,	the	only	real	alternative	to	Socrates’s	drinking	hemlock	is	his	not	drinking	hemlock.	There’s	 nothing	 to	 suggest	 that	 there	 are	 alternative	means	 of	 consuming	 the	hemlock,	 let	 alone	 that	 had	 Socrates	 not	 drank	 the	 hemlock	 he	 would	 have	consumed	 it	 in	 some	 other	 way	 (or	 consumed	 some	 other	 poison,	 or	 etc.).	Further,	it’s	not	a	common	occurrence	in	everyday	life	to	have	alternative	means	of	 consuming	 a	 given	 poison.	 Treating	 his	 eating	 hemlock,	 for	 example,	 as	 a	relevant	 alternative	 would	 be	 to	 arbitrarily	 introduce	 something	 that	 wasn’t	otherwise	 specified,	 and	 whose	 presence	 can’t	 be	 justified	 by	 everyday	experience.			The	problem	of	generic	causes	seems	to	get	off	the	ground	because	it	stipulates	a	range	 of	 relevant	 alternative	 possibilities	 to	 Socrates’s	 drinking	 hemlock,	 and	then	argues	that	given	these	other	possible	alternatives,	 the	causal	claim	is	not	proportional.	However,	I	have	argued	that	the	common	sense	cause	is	implicitly	relative	 to	a	context	 that	doesn’t	 include	 these	other	alternatives.	To	 introduce	these	other	alternatives	is	to	introduce	a	different	context	than	what	is	implicitly	in	play,	and	thereby	to	change	the	subject.	Relative	to	the	context	that	I	take	to	be	implicit,	the	common	sense	cause	is	proportional.			
9.	How	Exclusivity	Preserves	Causal	Intuitions		However,	 even	 given	 the	 possible	 alternatives	 raised	 by	 the	 objectors,	 the	common	 sense	 cause	 would	 still	 be	 proportional.	 This	 can	 be	 seen	 when	 we	
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respect	 the	 principle	 of	 exclusivity.	18	The	 problem	 presupposes	 that	 there	 is	some	 relevant	 alternative	 to	 Socrates’s	 drinking	 hemlock	 that	 preserves	 his	consuming	it.	Take	as	an	arbitrary	alternative	his	eating	hemlock.	But,	Socrates	could	 both	 drink	 and	 eat	 the	 hemlock	 –	 he	 could	wash	 down	 a	 hemlock	 salad	with	a	full	glass	of	hemlock	milk,	for	example.	Since	these	possibilities	can	occur	together,	 exclusivity	 dictates	 that	 they	 should	 be	 represented	 by	 distinct	variables	 –	 say	 by	 the	 variable	 D:	 {having-drank-hemlock,	 not-having-drank-
hemlock}	 from	before,	and	a	new	variable,	E,	 that	has	 the	values	{having-eaten-
hemlock,	having-not-eaten-hemlock}.		Fortunately,	there	is	still	no	problem	for	proportionality.	If	the	case	in	question	is	one	 in	 which	 Socrates	 doesn’t	 also	 eat	 the	 hemlock,	 then	 D	 satisfies	 PV	 with	respect	 to	 F.	 If	 the	 case	 in	 question	 is	 one	 in	 which	 Socrates	 also	 eats	 the	hemlock,	 then	we	 simply	have	 a	 case	of	 symmetric	 over-determination.	 Causal	accounts	 diverge	 in	 their	 response	 to	 these	 cases.	 But	 precisely	 how	 one	responds	to	symmetric	overdetermination	is	irrelevant	to	my	argument.	Insofar	as	the	common	sense	cause	is	taken	to	be	a	cause	at	all,	it	is	also	proportional.		There	 is,	 however,	 a	 way	 to	 manufacture	 a	 proportionality	 problem.	 If	 the	situation	 is	 such	 that	 Socrates’s	drinking	hemlock	 is	 indeed	mutually	 exclusive	with	 his	 eating	 hemlock,	 then	having-drank-hemlock	 and	having-eaten-hemlock	should	 be	 values	 of	 the	 same	 variable.	 Imagine	 that	 Socrates’s	 jailor	 only	 has	enough	money	to	purchase	either	hemlock	leaves	or	hemlock	milk,	but	not	both.	The	context	therefore	constrains	Socrates’s	options	so	that	his	drinking	hemlock	excludes	his	eating	it,	and	vice	versa.	Call	the	representative	variable	H:	{having-
drank-hemlock,	 having-eaten-hemlock,	 having-neither-drank-nor-eaten-hemlock}.	
H	does	 not	 satisfy	PV	relative	 to	D,	 since	 an	 intervention	 on	H	that	 changes	 its	value	from	having-drank-hemlock	to	having-eaten-hemlock	will	not	correspond	to	a	 change	 in	 D.	 Thus,	 neither	 Socrates’s	 drinking	 nor	 his	 eating	 will	 be	proportional.	 The	 proportional	 cause	 is	 instead	 something	 like	 his	 consuming	hemlock.	The	proportional	variable	would	instead	be	something	like	N:	{having-
consumed-hemlock,	not-having-consumed-hemlock}.			Notice,	 though,	 that	 this	 modal	 context	 is	 non-standard.	 It	 requires	 that	 we	abstract	away	from	normal	everyday	circumstances,	and	instead	fix	the	situation	in	 an	 arbitrarily	 constrained	 way	 in	 which	 the	 unique	 manner	 of	 Socrates’s	hemlock	consumption	is	decided	by	his	jailor’s	decision	at	the	shop.	When,	given	this	 background,	 we’re	 asked	 what	 was	 the	 cause	 of	 Socrates’s	 death,	 we	 are	arguably	forced	to	concede	that	 it	was	his	consuming	hemlock.	After	all,	 it	 isn’t	the	drinking	in	particular	nor	the	eating	in	particular	that	makes	a	difference	to	whether	Socrates	dies,	since	a	salient	reason	for	him	not	doing	one	is	that	he	in		18	This	is	a	similar	move	as	that	made	in	(Woodward,	2018).	
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fact	 did	 the	 other.	What	makes	 a	 difference	 is	whether	 he	 consumed	hemlock,	generally.	 I	 claim,	 therefore,	 that	 this	 final	 case	 does	 not	 in	 fact	 conflict	 with	common	sense.		
10.	The	Problem	of	Disjunctive	Causes	
	Shapiro	and	Sober	(2012)	have	a	related	objection.	They	also	argue	that	strong	proportionality	will	 delegitimize	many	 common	 sense	 causal	 claims.	 But,	 their	reasoning	behind	this	merits	its	own	response.		Shapiro	 and	 Sober	 provide	 the	 example	 of	 a	 non-monotonic	 function	 in	which	both	the	input	values	3	and	22	will	produce	the	same	effect	of	an	output	value	6.	This	is	one	instance	of	the	general	phenomenon	of	some	effect	being	caused	by	two	 different	 things.	 The	 truly	 proportional	 cause	 in	 these	 cases	 seems	 like	 it	must	be	a	disjunction.	 In	this	case,	 the	disjunction	of	being	3	or	being	22.	They	argue	that	strong	proportionalists	could	bite	the	bullet	and	concede	disjunctive	causes.	But,	doing	so	will	 lead	 them	away	 from	common	sense,	and	“will	mean	rejecting	almost	all	the	causal	statements	we	think	are	true.“	(Shapiro	and	Sober,	2012,	p.	90).19			Fortunately	for	the	strong	proportionalist,	this	conclusion	is	too	quick.	The	kind	of	 disjunctive	 causes	 that	would	 be	 responsible	 for	 contravening	many	 of	 our	causal	 intuitions	 are	 those	 that	 disjoin	 independent	 properties.	 These	 take	 a	form	 similar	 to	 the	 disjunctive	 cause	 in	 the	 following	 claim:	 ‘The	 cause	 of	Sophie’s	pecking	 is	 that	 “[she	was]	presented	with	any	red	 target,	 [or	she	was]	provided	 food,	 [or	she	was]	 tickled,	 and	 so	on.”’	 (Franklin-Hall,	 2016,	pp.	 566–577)	But	we’ve	already	seen	how	exclusivity	can	rule	out	this	kind	of	disjunction	as	a	possible	cause.	The	target’s	being	red	and	Sophie’s	being	tickled	should	be	values	of	different	variables.	This	simply	loops	back	to	my	earlier	response	to	the	problem	of	generic	causes.		However,	 there	 is	 a	 kind	 of	 disjunction	 that	 seems	 to	 pose	 an	 actual	 threat	 to	proportionality	–	the	kind	where	the	disjuncts	are	mutually	exclusive	properties.	For	example,	if	Sophie	pecked	at	all	and	only	blue	or	red	things.	Proportionality	would	 dictate	 that	 the	 cause	 of	 Sophie’s	 pecking	 would	 therefore	 be	 the	disjunctive	property	of	the	chip’s	being	red	or	blue.			The	best	response	on	behalf	of	strong	proportionality	may	indeed	be	to	bite	the	bullet	and	accept	disjunctive	causes	of	this	kind.	But	this	is	barely	a	case	of	biting	the	bullet	in	many	cases,	where	there	is	even	an	appropriate	single	term	for	the	relevant	disjunction.	An	example	of	this	is	the	final	Socrates	case	from	section	8.		19	The	fatality	of	this	problem	is	agreed	to	in	(Weslake,	2017;	Woodward,	2018)	
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There,	due	to	the	oddly	constrained	circumstances,	we	had	as	explicitly	mutually	exclusive	properties	Socrates’s	having	eaten	and	his	having	drank	hemlock.	As	a	result,	 I	 conceded,	 the	 principle	 of	 proportionality	 legitimizes	 as	 the	 cause	 the	property	 of	 Socrates	 having	 consumed	 hemlock.	 The	 reason	 is	 that	 the	 real	proportional	 cause	 here	 is	 the	 disjunctive	 property,	 Socrates’s	 having	 eaten	 or	drank	hemlock.	And	‘Socrates’s	having	consumed	hemlock’	is	the	most	accurate	term	for	such	a	disjunction.		Sometimes,	however,	there	is	no	neat,	single	term.	This	is	the	case	for	the	earlier	property	of	being	red	or	blue.	This	very	limited	kind	of	case	is	the	real	issue	for	the	strong	proportionalist.	I	argue,	though,	that	it’s	not	such	an	issue.	It’s	merely	an	accident	of	language	in	these	cases	that	we	can’t	refer	to	the	disjunction	with	a	 single	 term.20	One	 possible	 explanation	 of	 this	 calls	 upon	 the	 utility	 of	 an	economical	 language	 –	 one	 which	 doesn’t	 multiply	 terms	 unnecessarily.	 We	could	have	introduced	a	single	term	for	things	that	are	red	or	blue,	which	would	then	allow	us	to	pick	out	the	cause	 in	the	example	case	with	a	single	term.	But	the	utility	of	 such	a	 term	 fails	 to	 justify	 its	 introduction.	The	example	 case	 is	 a	weird	one,	and	for	cases	like	this	we	can	simply	employ	the	‘or’	operator,	albeit	sacrificing	whatever	 utility	 is	 produced	 by	 being	 able	 to	 identify	 causal	 relata	with	single	terms.			
11.	Conclusion	
	I	 have	 defended	 a	 causal	 model	 formulation	 of	 strong	 proportionality	 by	explicating	 the	exclusivity	and	exhaustivity	principles	of	variable	selection,	and	stipulating	 that	 proportionality	 requires	 that	 variables	 obey	 these	 principles.	 I	then	responded	to	Franklin-Hall’s	objection	and	the	problem	of	generic	causes,	each	 of	 which	 dissolves	 once	 the	 principles	 are	 honored.	 While	 much	 of	 the	problem	of	disjunctive	causes	similarly	dissolves,	the	strong	proportionalist	does	need	to	concede	the	kind	of	disjunctive	cause	where	the	disjuncts	are	mutually	exclusive	properties.	 Sometimes	we	have	a	 single	 term	 for	 such	a	disjunct,	but	sometimes	not.	I’ve	argued	that	it’s	merely	an	accident	of	language	when	not.		As	 mentioned,	 these	 principles	 have	 been	 defined	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 a	variable	 represents	 a	 particular	 object’s	 instantiation	 of	 a	 particular	 type	 of	property.	 But	 they	 are	 easily	 generalized	 to	 cover	 alternate	 objects	 of	representation.	Take	events,	for	example.	If	variables	represent	particular	kinds	of	 events	 occurring	 or	 failing	 to	 occur,	 then	 exclusivity	would	 require	 that	 the	values	 of	 a	 variable	 be	 event	 occurrences	 such	 that	 no	 two	 could	 occur	simultaneously.	 Exhaustivity	would	 require	 that	 the	 values	 of	 a	 variable	 cover	
	20	Thanks	to	David	Papineau,	in	discussion,	for	this	point.	
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the	entire	range	of	possibilities	of	event	occurrence	 for	whatever	 type	of	event	the	variable	represents.		
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